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Perfectionistic individuals portray themselves as both saints and sinners
because they “can describe themselves, in the very same sentence, as both
better than everyone else and worse than everyone else ”1
Justifying the inclusion of supererogatory acts into a moral theory involves an articulation of
how an act can be good and yet not morally required. In this paper, I argue that one approach
is to appeal to the potential consequences of adhering to a demanding moral theory – one
where all actions of moral significance are either morally required or morally forbidden –
by exploring the work on psychological perfectionism. Psychological perfectionism is, I
argue, the non-moral analogue of a demanding moral theory. The evidence demonstrates
that by demanding of themselves that they reach high non-moral standards, perfectionists
make it less likely that they will reach their goals. I argue that this gives us reason to
believe that there is a ‘paradox of obligation’: that requiring agents to meet exceedingly
high moral standards will have the effect of making them less likely to meet them. Thus,
just as perfectionists are encouraged to draw a distinction between being their best and being
good enough, I argue that the solution to the paradox of obligation is to place limits on what
we require of ourselves and others. We ought to, at the very least, consider some actions to
1 Sorotzkin, “Understanding and Treating Perfectionism in Religious Adolescents,” 91. Discussed in Flett
and Hewitt, “Positive Versus Negative Perfectionism in Psychopathology A Comment on Slade and Owens’s
Dual Process Model,” 487.
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be supererogatory. I also draw on the literature on perfectionism to argue that this does not
mean that we are forced to accept a ‘morality of complacency.’ The literature makes clear
that it is possible to still aim high without considering ourselves required to do so.
Introduction
Justifying the existence of supererogatory acts involves explaining how an act can be good
to do and yet one that we are not required to perform. In this paper, I present a strategy
that should be of interest to the most recalcitrant of anti-supererogationists, such as act
consequentialists, who insist all morally significant actions are either morally required or
morally forbidden. I challenge, not the particular demands that these theories make, but the
demandingness of these theories: the lack of room they leave for optional acts. While there
are many good reasons to challenge theories that fail to make room for optional acts, the
avenue of attack I present here is to argue that a particular problem arises for theories that
require agents to meet exceedingly high standards: that requiring agents to meet these high
standards will have the effect of making them less likely to do so. I call this the ‘paradox of
obligation’. It is paradoxical because, as I explore, requiring an action is thought to make
agents more likely to perform the act in question, whereas the opposite if often true. Ad-
ditionally, I call it a paradox of obligation intending it to be reminiscent of the paradox of
hedonism, as I believe they raise similar sorts of challenges. William Bennett famously said
that “Happiness is like a cat, if you try to coax it or call it, it will avoid you, it will never
come. But if you pay it no attention and go about your business, you’ll find it rubbing up
against your legs and jumping into your lap.” Based on thoughts like this, the paradox of
hedonism claims that by aiming for pleasure or happiness, we are less likely to experience
it. The classic response to the paradox of hedonism is to claim that it does not challenge
hedonism as a criterion of rightness: those acts that lead to the maximisation of pleasure
really are the right things to do; it only challenges hedonism as an action-guiding theory.
When we go about attempting to do what is right according to hedonism, the paradox of
hedonism teaches us that we ought not to do so directly; if our actions are guided by the
pursuit of pleasure, we will thereby fail to maximise it. Thus, the paradox of hedonism does
challenge hedonism as an action-guiding theory, the latter of which is an important compo-
nent of any moral theory that is to instruct us how to act. My paradox of obligation presents
a similar challenge: while it may not undermine a demanding moral theory as a criterion
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of rightness, it does undermine such a theory as an action-guiding theory. The result is that
even those who adhere to a demanding moral theory as a criterion of rightness should still
at least consider some acts to be supererogatory, on the action-guiding component of their
theory.2 This significantly narrows the scope of the anti-supererogationist position.
I briefly consider a challenge that might be raised to this, that it endorses a sort of moral
complacency, a satisfaction with meeting the low bar of being ‘good enough’ or ‘not bad’.
However, the psychological literature is of help here too: it gives us reason to hope that we
can aim high without considering ourselves obliged.
Obligations and psychological perfectionism
The nature of obligations
Supererogatory acts are distinguished from obligations because supererogatory acts are,
by definition, not required. Therefore, establishing the possibility of supererogatory acts
depends on the sense of ‘required’ at play in that definition. The sense of ‘required’ must be
one that is beyond that of ‘ought’. This is because there are some senses of ‘ought’ whereby
supererogatory actions can as easily be understood acts that ought to be done: for example,
a supererogatory act is one that ought to be done if ‘ought’ simply means good to do, or
favoured by the balance of reasons, or yielding a state of affairs that ought to be. This is
unproblematic because there are senses of ‘ought’ that are distinct from obligation. What
needs to be identified, therefore, is what the notion of ‘obligation’ adds beyond the notion
of ‘ought’. The answer I believe is in the force that obligations have.
The language of obligations mirrors that of necessity. Obligations are things that we
must keep. If we are obliged to do something, then we have to do it. This can be contrasted
with ‘ought’. Kai von Fintel and Sabine Iatridou ask their readers to consider the following
sign, posted at a summer camp on Cape Cod: “After using the bathroom, everybody ought to
wash their hands; employees have to.”3 We can see here that in ordinary usage obligations
exhibit strong necessity in contrast to ‘ought’. Beyond ordinary usage, this is also evident
in the consequences of failing to do what is obligatory. Firstly, when we fail to do what is
2 Some may claim that it also presents a challenge for an adequate criterion of rightness. If so, then this is
all to the good a defence of supererogation. However, I want to demonstrate that, even if this is not claims, the
scope of an anti-supererogationist position is still limited.
3 Fintel and Iatridou, “How to Say Ought in Foreign: The Composition of Weak Necessity Modals,” 116.
104 Claire Benn
obligatory, we thereby do something forbidden; performing a forbidden act is often seen as
a serious moral failing which can say something about us much more generally. If I tell a lie,
then I could be considered a liar; if I commit an act of murder, then I am a murderer. It does
not count equally heavily all the occasions on which I have not lied or have not murdered.
Secondly, when we fail to do what is obligatory, then punishment, reprisals, criticism and
guilt are often considered appropriate. Indeed, some, such as Mary Forrester, go so far as
to define obligatory acts as those such that “some sanction or other, whether mild or severe,
ought to be available in cases of breach of obligation. If no sanction whatever ought to be
used,” she continues, “then the act in question is not an obligation.”4
Unlike in the case of obligations, however, failures to perform supererogatory actions
lead to neither of the above consequences. Omissions of supererogatory actions are permis-
sible; therefore, failing to perform a supererogatory action does not say something negative
about us or reflect negatively on our character more generally. Also, neither sanctions nor
punishments are appropriate for failing to perform a supererogatory act. As David Heyd ar-
gues, it is a defining feature of a supererogatory act that “Its omission is not wrong, and does
not deserve sanction or criticism – either formal or informal.”5 He claims that “Only strict
anti-supererogationists maintain that failure to act supererogatorily deserves and should en-
tail condemnation in the same way as failure to do one’s duty does.”6 If an act is optional,
then its omission is immune from any criticism. This, Heyd argues, is true therefore of all
supererogatory acts, even for omissions of the simplest of favours.7 Of course, immunity
from criticism does not mean that we cannot recommend or encourage such behaviour, an
issue I return to later in this paper.8 Demanding moral theories, therefore, are those the-
4 Forrester, “Some Remarks on Obligation, Permission, and Supererogation,” 220.
5 Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, 115.
6 Ibid., 125.
7 Of course, sometimes people do criticise those who omit supererogatory acts. However, this is does not
undermine Heyd’s point, which is that such criticism is not justified. Also, there are times when acts that seem
supererogatory may well be obligatory given that they involve very little cost to the agent or because they are
constitutive of certain relationships and so on. In these case, criticism for failing to perform them is warranted.
8 Heyd also argues that supererogatory acts “cannot be described as something which ought to be done”
(Ibid.) However, this I believe overstates his case. It is not necessary to claim that supererogatory acts cannot
be described as ones that ought to be done on every possible interpretation of ‘ought’. It is enough that su-
pererogatory actions are in no way obligatory. Heyd claims that they are not acts that ought to be done in order
to resist any argument that they are imperfect duties. However, I believe that imperfect duties are ones that we
have to do some of the time, or through some means of our choice, or so on. This means that sanctions would
be appropriate if we never performed them at any time. Therefore, the immunity from criticism is enough to
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ories that are anti-supererogationist because they leave no room for optional acts, as they
consider every act of moral significance to be either morally required or morally forbidden.
I turn now to outlining psychological perfectionism and to demonstrating its analogy with
demanding moral theories.
Psychological perfectionism
The ‘perfectionism’ of interest here is ‘psychological perfectionism,’ a separate notion from
the ‘perfectionism’ we might find in moral, political or value theory. In a definition that
captures the heart of almost all definitions of psychological perfectionism, Frost, Marten,
Lahart, and Rosenblate describe it as the setting of excessively high standards “which are
accompanied by tendencies for overly critical evaluations of one’s own behaviour.”9 The
descriptions of perfectionism and perfectionists reveal important similarities with moral
requirements. Firstly, the standards and rules the perfectionists require themselves to abide
by often have the same form of strong necessity as moral obligations: for a perfectionist, it
is not just that ‘I ought to be working all the time’, but ‘I have to be working all the time’;
it is not just that ‘my talk should be perfect’, but ‘my talk must be perfect.’ The prescriptive
form of these standards and rules is a marked feature; indeed Karen Horney characterises
perfectionism as “the tyranny of the shoulds.”10
Secondly, and due to the prescriptive force of these standards, perfectionists are often
preoccupied with what is referred to as ‘concern over mistakes’: a fear of failing to meet
the standards in question.11 Perfectionism has been defined by some as “the tendency to
believe there is a perfect solution to every problem, that doing something perfectly (i.e.,
mistake-free) is not only possible, but also necessary, and that even minor mistakes will have
serious consequences.”12 Gordon Flett and Paul Hewitt cite many studies that demonstrate
deny that they are a type of imperfect duty without needing to claim that they are not acts that ought to be done
in any sense of the term.
9 Frost et al., “The Dimensions of Perfectionism,” 450.
10 Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth.
11 Frost et al. hypothesised five dimensions that contribute to total perfectionism. Concern over mistakes
constituted the dimensions most strongly correlated with (negative) perfectionism, though not with positive
perfectionism as distinguished later in this paper. (Frost et al., “A Comparison of Two Measures of Perfection-
ism.”)
12 Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, “Cognitive Assessment of Obsessive-Compulsive Dis-
order.”
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perfectionism to be “associated with a fear of failure and an inability to tolerate failure.”13
As with obligations, for perfectionists, even small failures to meet their standards can have
serious, negative consequences. This can be seen by a therapeutic technique used to help
those with perfectionism. Perfectionists are asked to think about the ‘or. . .’ that follows
a statement that begins with ‘I must. . .’ or ‘I should. . .’ or ‘I have to. . .’ So ‘I must read
absolutely everything on this subject before starting my work’ might be followed by ‘or I
will look stupid and lazy.’ ‘I have to be working all the time’ might be followed by ‘or I
will fail all my exams and never be able to get a job.’ Perfectionists also believe that failures
to meet the standards on a particular occasion can say something about them much more
generally, as a person, or a family member, or an employee. This is partly due to a cognitive
bias that is caused by concern over mistakes. Roz Shafran et al. demonstrate
that people with clinical perfectionism evaluate their standards and perfor-
mance in a biased way. Such biases include selective attention to ‘failure’
and the discounting of ‘success’. This involves paying more attention to per-
ceived or actual errors in performance than to the parts of performance that
were error-free.14
Just as with failures to meet our obligations, perfectionists also believe that punishment and
criticism are legitimated by failures to meet the standards set. This often constitutes one of
the fears perfectionists exhibit about failing to meet the rules and standards set.
On the basis of these striking similarities, I contend that psychological perfectionism is
the non-moral analogue of the adherence to a demanding moral theory. They both exhibit
standards and rules of strong necessity, where failing to meet these can legitimate criticism
and censure; what is more, the consequences of failure are serious, negative and generalise
to saying something about the character of the agent. This is of significance because the
well-documented consequences of being a perfectionist strongly suggest that adhering to a
demanding moral theory would give rise to what I have called the paradox of obligation:
13 Flett et al., “Components of Perfectionism and Procrastination in College Students” and Flett et al., “Per-
fectionism, Self-Actualization, and Personal Adjustment.” Cited in Flett and Hewitt, “Positive Versus Negative
Perfectionism in Psychopathology A Comment on Slade and Owens’s Dual Process Model,” 481.
14 Shafran, Cooper, and Fairburn, “Clinical Perfectionism: a Cognitive-Behavioural Analysis,” 782. For
further evidence of this see Antony and Swinson,When Perfect Isn’t Good Enough: Strategies for Coping with
Perfectionism. Burns, “The Perfectionist’s Script for Self-Defeat.” Hamachek, “Psychodynamics of Normal
and Neurotic Perfectionism.” Hollender, “Perfectionism.”
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that by requiring that we meet a high moral standard, we make it less likely that we actually
do.
Consequences of perfectionism
The literature on perfectionism often emphasises the effect on the mental health of per-
fectionists. Perfectionism is usually considered to be a psychopathology that requires ad-
dressing in order for the person to have a healthy and satisfying life. This is predominantly
because of the correlation between perfectionism and depression and anxiety. This is unsur-
prising in light of the biases discussed earlier. When we are preoccupied with the avoidance
of failure and yet hardly recognise when we meet the standards in question, we are likely to
be riddled with fear and guilt. The detrimental effects of someone who holds themselves to
demanding non-moral standards are partly attributable to the role that self-criticism plays
in the feeling that one is required or obliged to meet such standards. David Dunkley et al.
link self-criticism to the link between perfectionism and depressive, anxiety, and eating dis-
order symptoms.15 As Shafran et al. explain, “The core psychopathology of perfectionism
is expressed as a morbid fear of failure and the relentless pursuit of success.”16 This has
serious implications for considering ourselves required to do our moral best or even just
to meet demanding moral standards, as in the case of anti-supererogationist positions. The
consequences are likely to be similar in the case of a demanding moral theory as in the case
of perfectionism: depression and anxiety.
What is of concern for establishing my paradox of obligation is the counter-productivity
of perfectionism. The fear of failure discussed above comes from requiring the meeting of
exceedingly high standards. This fear, as Don E. Hamachek argues, “leads to avoidance
behaviour.”17 By trying to avoid failing to meet the standards, we also tend to avoid meet-
ing them too. The evidence for the avoidant behaviour of perfectionistic thinking and the
counter-productivity that this entails is well-document and has become central to the def-
inition of perfectionism itself. As Shafran et al. establish, “it is inevitable that for some
people the pursuit of their standards and their fear of failure to meet them becomes so aver-
15 Dunkley et al., “Personal Standards and Evaluative Concerns Dimensions of ‘clinical’ Perfectionism: A
Reply to Shafran et Al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt et Al.(2003),” 78. Dunkley et al. were, specifically, correlating
negative perfectionism or perfectionistic concern (which I have termed, simply, ‘perfectionism’ for this part of
the paper) with these symptoms.
16 Shafran, Cooper, and Fairburn, “Clinical Perfectionism: a Cognitive-Behavioural Analysis,” 779.
17 Hamachek, “Psychodynamics of Normal and Neurotic Perfectionism,” 28.
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sive that they delay beginning tasks (procrastination), abandon them midway or avoid them
entirely.”18
It is the fear and anxiety that accompanies perfectionism that means that avoidant and
counter-productive behaviour is engaged in. This fear and anxiety is generated by the re-
quired nature of the demands that perfectionists place themselves under. We can predict
that fear and anxiety would also accompany attempts to adhere to a demanding moral the-
ory, because it too requires certain behaviour from agents. We can, therefore, also predict
that adherents would similarly engage in avoidant or counter-productive behaviour. If, for
example, it was believed that doing one’s moral best is required (on pain on sanctions, crit-
icism, guilt, and so on), then agents may avoid situations where they might be called on to
do good. They might, for example, become so obsessed with giving money only to the best
or most efficient charity that they fail to give any money at all.
Thus we arrive, by analogy, at ‘the paradox of obligation’: considering some actions to
be morally obligatory can lead us to be less likely to perform them. The counter-productive
nature of perfectionism stems from the fear of failing to meet the standards set. As this is
a feature shared by demanding moral theories, we can predict that such fears would also
lead to the same type of counter-productive behaviour. Part of the reason for considering an
act to be obligatory is to encourage people to perform that act and to hold them to account
when they fail to do so. However, the literature on perfectionism demonstrates that this can
have the opposite effect. Now the question is what we should do in response to this.
Limiting the demandingness of our moral theory
The therapeutic solution to perfectionism is to encourage perfectionists to acknowledge
that there is a state of being ‘good enough’ or performing a task ‘well enough’ that is below
doing one’s utmost or one’s best. This involves lowering the standards that perfectionists
believe they are required to meet. When we lower the standards that we are required to
meet, we open up the way for exceeding those standards. By allowing for the possibility of
exceeding the standards, the fear of failing to meet them is removed, freeing the agent in
question from the counter-productive consequences that would otherwise result.
I contend the solution in the moral case ought to be the same. The level of what is
18 Ibid., 782. See Antony and Swinson,When Perfect Isn’t Good Enough: Strategies for Coping with Perfec-
tionism; Burns, “The Perfectionist’s Script for Self-Defeat”; Frost et al., “The Dimensions of Perfectionism”;
Slade and Owens, “A Dual Process Model of Perfectionism Based on Reinforcement Theory.”
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required must be reduced. Like in the non-moral case, this opens up the way for exceeding
what is required. In the moral case, this amounts to allowing for optional actions: actions
which are neither morally required nor morally forbidden. They are, additionally, good to
do, which is why they were considered required in the first place. In other words, it opens
the way for supererogatory actions.19 A defining feature of supererogatory actions is that
their omissions are free from censure. Supererogatory actions, in virtue of not being oblig-
atory, are not accompanied by the fear of failure and concern over mistakes associated with
the latter. This eliminates the counter-productive behaviour that results from considering
everything morally good, or praiseworthy or right to do to be morally required.
The literature on perfectionism strongly suggests that when we limit what is required,
we free people to pursue their intended goals more effectively and make them more respon-
sive to the consequences of their acts.
The paradox of hedonism and the paradox of obligation
I return briefly to the issue of the scope of the paradox raised. This paradox is one of mo-
tivation and stems from people considering some actions to be required, either morally or
non-morally. The solution then is that we consider some acts to be optional (thereby open-
ing the way to consider some actions supererogatory). Importantly, this does not necessar-
ily entail anything about demanding moral theories qua criterions of rightness. However,
if correct, my argument does undermine any such theory’s claim to being an action-guiding
theory. To continue with the analogy, just as the paradox of hedonism tells us we ought not
be motivated directly by the seeking of pleasure, the paradox of obligation tells us we, at
least, ought not be motivated directly by an action’s being obligatory???i.e. we ought to, at
minimum, consider some acts to be supererogatory.
The challenge of complacency
I suggested above that the solution to the paradox of obligation for demanding moral theo-
ries is to lower the standards. However, lowering standards might seem counterproductive
to motivating people to do what is good to do; high standards sounds like they would be
19 Other conditions, beyond being good and optional, have been offered as necessary for an act being su-
pererogatory. However, as I have argued elsewhere, it is the compossibility of these two features that have been
contentious. No one has claimed that given the optionality and goodness are in anyway incompatible with any
other proposed condition of supererogatory acts.
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more effective for achieving this end. If we lower these standards, then it might seem like
simply encouraging people to aim low. This sounds worryingly like a simple endorsement
of self-satisfaction with being morally mediocre. Surely, one might argue, perfectionism is
preferable to non-perfectionism and, as such, a demanding moral theory is preferable to one
of moral complacency. However, this draws a false dichotomy between a demanding moral
theory and a complacent one, based on an equally false dichotomy between perfectionism,
as described above, and non-perfectionism.
Positive conceptions of perfectionism
As Stoeber and Otto explain:
“Traditionally, perfectionism has been associated with psychopathology, with
psychodynamic theory stressing that perfectionism was a sign of a neurotic
and disordered personality (e.g., Horney, 1951; Missildine, 1963)[20]. [. . .] the
dominant view of the 1980s was that perfectionism was always neurotic, dys-
functional, and indicative of psychopathology (e.g. D.D. Burns, 1980; Pacht,
1984)[21].”22
However, in recent years, many psychologists have started discussing a different type of
perfectionism, one that is more positive than the pathological type focused on in previous
years. Based on clinical observations and anecdotal evidence, Hamachek proposed that
there were two related but separable clusters of features that were ambiguously subsumed
under the term ‘perfectionism.’ He therefore drew a distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘neu-
rotic’ perfectionism.23
Since Hamachek’s seminal work, many other theorists have also drawn distinctions
between these two types of perfectionism though few have agreed on the nomenclature.
Stoeber and Otto give an overview of the differing terminologies in use: “positive striv-
ing and maladaptive evaluative concern (Frost, Heinberg, Holt, Mattia & Neubauer, 1993),
active and passive perfectionism (Adkins & Parker, 1996), positive and negative perfec-
tionism (Terry-Short, Owens, Slade & Dewey, 1995), adaptive and maladaptive perfection-
20 They refer here to Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth and Missildine, Your Inner Child of the Past.
21 They refer here to Burns, “The Perfectionist’s Script for Self-Defeat” and Pacht, “Reflections on Perfec-
tion.”
22 Stoeber and Otto, “Positive Conceptions of Perfectionism: Approaches, Evidence, Challenges,” 296.
23 Hamachek, “Psychodynamics of Normal and Neurotic Perfectionism.”
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ism (Rice, Ashby, & Slaney, 1998), functional and dysfunctional perfectionism (Rhe´aume,
Freeston, et al., 2000), healthy and unhealthy perfectionism (Stumpf & Parker, 2000), per-
sonal standards and evaluative concerns perfectionism (Blankstein & Dunkley, 2002), and
conscientious and self-evaluative perfectionism (Hill et al., 2004).”24
In the rest of this paper, I use the following terms for the distinction: positive perfec-
tionism, constituted by perfectionistic strivings and exhibited by what Stoeber and Otto call
‘healthy perfectionists’; and negative perfectionism, constituted by perfectionistic concern
and exhibited by what Stoeber and Otto call ‘unhealthy perfectionists’. Perfectionistic con-
cern is constituted by ‘concern over mistakes’. The perfectionism that has been discussed
thus far, therefore, is negative perfectionism. Vitally, perfectionistic striving on the other
hand is unrelated to concern over mistake; the studies Stoeber and Otto mention above all
conclude that it is possible to have perfectionistic striving without perfectionistic concern. It
follows from this that it is possible to hold oneself to a high standard and strive to be better
without being (pathologically) concerned about failing to meet one’s standards. As such, it
is also possible to do so without beating oneself up when the standards are not met, and so
too, then, without becoming fearful, anxious, depressed and avoidant.
Stoeber and Otto give a comprehensive literature review of those studies that distinguish
positive and negative perfectionism.25 According to these studies, when the defining feature
of negative perfectionism – concern over mistakes – is removed (as in the case of positive
perfectionism), the possibility of healthier individuals, who are more motivated and more
successful is revealed. According to the studies Stoeber and Otto consider,
“only [perfectionistic] concerns were related to higher levels of negative affect
24 Stoeber and Otto, ‘Positive Conceptions of Perfectionism’, 295. The works referred to here are Frost et
al., “A Comparison of Two Measures of Perfectionism.” Adkins and Parker, “Perfectionism and Suicidal Preoc-
cupation.” Terry-Short et al., “Positive and Negative Perfectionism.” Rice, Ashby, and Slaney, “Self-Esteem as
a Mediator Between Perfectionism and Depression: A Structural Equation Analysis.” Rhe´aume et al., “Func-
tional and Dysfunctional Perfectionists: Are They Different on Compulsive-Like Behaviors?”. Stumpf and
Parker, “A Hierarchical Structural Analysis of Perfectionism and Its Relation to Other Personality Character-
istics.” Blankstein and Dunkley, “Evaluative Concerns, Self-Critical, and Personal Standards Perfectionism:
A Structural Equation Modeling Strategy.” Hill et al., “A New Measure of Perfectionism: The Perfectionism
Inventory.”
25 Stoeber and Otto: “the psycINFO database was searched for all publications up to Week 2 of September
2005 with perfect, perfection, perfectionism, perfectionist, perfectionistic, or perfectionists in the title” and
looked for those that investigated the two basic forms of perfectionism under a variety of approaches and labels
(see Stoeber and Otto, “Positive Conceptions of Perfectionism: Approaches, Evidence, Challenges,” 297.)
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and depression (and unrelated to positive affect). In contrast, [perfectionistic]
striving was related to higher levels of positive affect (and unrelated to negative
affect and depression). [. . .] only the perfectionistic concerns dimension re-
lated to negative characteristics whereas the perfectionistic strivings dimension
related to positive characteristics.”26
Frost et al. also found the same. They employed the Positive Affect-Negative Affect Scale
(PANAS)27:
“The PANAS is a self-report mood scale which contains two orthogonal dimen-
sions. Positive Affect (PA) reflects feelings of energy, enthusiasm, and activity.
Negative Affect (NA) reflects feelings of anger, fear, guilt, etc. Pure depressed
mood have been associated with a combination of high NA and low PA, while
anxiety and the anxiety component of depressive states have been associated
with high NA only (Watson & Kendall, 1989).”28
They also employed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)29, “a general measure of severity
of depression.”30 They discovered that “The [perfectionistic striving] factor was correlated
with PA from the PANAS, while the [perfectionistic concerns] factor was correlated only
with NA from the PANAS and the BDI.”31
The positive consequences of perfectionistic striving without perfectionistic concern are
overwhelming:
“In sum, studies taking a dimensional approach [perfectionistic striving vs. per-
fectionistic concern] have shown the dimension of perfectionistic strivings to
be related to high levels of conscientiousness, extraversion, endurance, posi-
tive affect, satisfaction with life, active coping styles, and achievement, and to
lower levels of external control and suicidal ideation. Moreover, when over-
lap with the dimension representing perfectionistic concerns was taken into
26 Ibid., 297.
27 This is the PANAS scale outlined in Watson, Clark, and Tellegan, “Development and Validation of Brief
Measures of Positive Affect: The PANAS Scales.”
28 Frost et al., “A Comparison of Two Measures of Perfectionism,” 121. For more information see, Wat-
son and Kendall, “Understanding Anxiety and Depression: Their Relation to Negative and Positive Affective
States.”
29 See Beck et al., “An Inventory for Measuring Depression.”
30 Frost et al., “A Comparison of Two Measures of Perfectionism,” 121.
31 Ibid., 125–6.
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account, perfectionistic strivings were also related to high levels of perceived
social support and lower levels of depression, self-blame, and perceived has-
sles. Furthermore, studies [. . .] have found that individuals with high levels
of perfectionistic strivings and low levels of perfectionistic concerns (healthy
perfectionists) show higher levels of self-esteem, agreeableness, social integra-
tion (e.g., greater social interest, greater willingness to go along with others),
and academic adaption (e.g., higher grade point average [GPA], greater GPA
satisfaction); show lower levels of anxiety, depression, procrastination, defen-
siveness, maladaptive coping styles, and interpersonal problems; and report
fewer somatic complaints and psychological symptoms than individuals with
high levels of perfectionistic strivings and high levels of perfectionistic con-
cerns (unhealthy perfectionists) or individuals with low level of perfectionistic
strivings (non-perfectionists).”32
Reinforcement and punishment
One of the central beliefs of many negative perfectionists is that, without requiring them-
selves to meet the high standards they set themselves, they would be unable to motivate
themselves to do better. The threat of failure, catastrophe, disappointment and censure
discussed earlier, they believe, provides motivation without which the alternative is non-
perfectionism and therefore a lack of achievement. However, this is simply mistaken. It
is possible to hold ourselves to a high standard without relying on the threat of failure and
censure. This is what the category of perfectionistic strivings teaches: it is possible to em-
ploy positive reinforcers such as pride, praise and achievement to motivate us without the
need to employ negative reinforcers such as the avoidance of failure and censure.33
Terry-Short et al. demonstrate that “neurotic (negative) perfectionism is that which is a
function of avoidance of negative consequences” and that “the concept of Positive Perfec-
tionism is that which is a function of achievement of positive consequences.”34 The carrot
32 Ibid., 312.
33 B.F. Skinner, the father of Operant Conditioning, discusses positive and negative reinforcement (as well
as positive and negative punishment). For more information, see his “Superstition in the Pigeon.” For an
interesting discussion of this issue, see Slade and Owens, “A Dual Process Model of Perfectionism Based on
Reinforcement Theory.”
34 Terry-Short et al., “Positive and Negative Perfectionism,” 667. Here they are specifically referring to the
neurotic (negative perfectionism) described by Hamachek, “Psychodynamics of Normal and Neurotic Perfec-
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and stick therefore represent two different mechanisms of learning and motivation and it
is this difference – between positive and negative reinforcement – that, as Terry-Short et
al. argue above, marks the distinction between perfectionistic striving and perfectionistic
concern.
There can also be positive and negative reinforcement in the moral case. As established
earlier, due to the force that obligations have by their nature, there are serious negative
consequences for failing to meet them. This means that performing our duty is negatively
reinforced: we avoid punishment that would otherwise be legitimated, such as a sense of
moral failing, guilt, shame and the censure and disappointment of others. However, as
established in the non-moral case, it is a mistake to think that this is the only form of moti-
vation. Supererogation provides an alternative mechanism of motivation: praise, gratitude
and esteem. We can be motivated by these consequences of performing supererogatory acts
(rather than by the avoidance of the negative consequences of failing to do our duty). By the
very nature of exceeding the standard set, we need not be afraid of failing to do so. Meet-
ing a required standard often leaves perfectionists feeling relief at having avoided disaster.
However, when we exceed a standard the feeling is one of pride. This provides positive en-
couragement for performing the act in question, which constitutes a much more successful
form of motivation than a fear of failure. As the literature on perfectionistic strivings shows,
this method of motivation is often much more effective than the avoidance of punishment.
Conclusion
Negative perfectionists, consumed by concerns over failing to meet their standards, often
engage in problematic, unhealthy and counter-productive behaviour; positive perfection-
ists, who aim high but do not consider reaching their targets to be required, are much
more likely to be happy, to have increased measures of well-being and to reach the goals
set. Thus the problem the literature on psychological perfectionism raises pertains to con-
sidering it required to meet one’s aims. Requiring brings with it a fear of failure, since
failure involves serious, negative consequences such as punishment and criticism. These
anxiety-inducing consequences cause us to become avoidant and self-defeating. Perfection-
istic striving avoids all this without being reduced to complacency. As Frost et al. state
“The psychological problems associated with perfectionism are probably more closely as-
tionism.” and Slade, “Towards a Function Analysis of Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa.”
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sociated with [the] critical evaluation tendencies than with the setting of excessively high
standards.”35 Just as perfectionistic striving provides an alternative to both perfectionistic
concern and non-perfectionism, a supererogationist moral theory provides an alternative to
both a demanding moral theory and a complacent or self-satisfied one.
I have shown here that there is a real issue of motivation when it comes to requiring
that we meet high moral standards, just as in the non-moral case. The solution I propose
is that, at the very least on the action-guiding level, we should consider some actions to be
supererogatory. We should lower the standards so that it is not the case that all morally sig-
nificant acts are either morally required or morally forbidden. This opens up the possibility
of going beyond what is required of us. By doing this we make it much more likely that
we will do what is required and go far beyond it as well, reaching our goals in a way made
nearly impossible on a more demanding moral theory.
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